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A chapter linking universities and welfare states to permanent financial austerity can 
take a shorter or a longer historical perspective. This chapter looks further back (to the 
postwar expansion of European welfare states) to better understand future 
transformations of both public institutions. Their long-term sustainability problems did 
not start with the financial crisis of 2008 but have been growing since the 1970s 
(Schäfer and Streeck 2013; Bonoli and Natali 2012; Hay and Wincott 2012). Financial 
austerity is not a post-crisis phenomenon. As a concept, it was used in welfare state 
research at least a decade earlier, although it does not seem to have been used in higher 
education studies until recently. Two quotations bring us to the heart of the matter: 
welfare states and universities are currently changing under adverse financial 
conditions caused by an array of interrelating and mutually reinforcing forces and their 
long-term financial sustainability is at stake across Europe. As Paul Pierson 
emphasized at the turn of the century: 
 
Signs of strain are everywhere. The struggle to balance budgets is unending, 
even as many governments cope with levels of debt unprecedented in peace-
time. … Despite their striking resilience over a quarter-century of “crisis”, 
welfare states are widely held to be under siege (Pierson 2001a: 80). 
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The welfare state now faces a context of essentially permanent austerity. 
Changes in the global economy, the sharp slowdown in economic growth, the 
maturation of governmental commitments, and population aging all generate 
considerable fiscal stress. There is little reason to expect these pressures to 
diminish over the next few decades. If anything, they are likely to intensify 
(Pierson 2001b: 411). 
 
Indeed, thinking specifically about universities: “signs of strain” are everywhere, and 
“permanent austerity” determines their daily operations and institutional strategies for 
the future.  
 
The welfare state is a “particular trademark of the European social model” (Svallfors 
2012: 1), “the jewel in the crown” and a “fundamental part of what Europe stands for” 
(Giddens 2006: 14), as are tuition-free universities, the cornerstone of 
intergenerational social mobility in Continental Europe (Kwiek 2015c). The past 
trajectories of major types of welfare states and of universities in Europe tend to go 
hand in hand: first vastly expanding following the Second World War, and especially 
in the 1960s and 1970s, and then being in the state of permanent resource-driven and 
legitimacy-based “crisis” in the last two decades. Welfare states and universities, two 
critically important public institutions, seem to be under heavy attacks from the 
public, the media and politicians. Their long-term sustainability is being questioned, 
and solutions to their (real and perceived) problems are being sought at global, 
European, and national levels. Despite vastly different national circumstances – 
welfare state regimes and universities being born in different national contexts (see 
Kwiek 2005 on Central Europe and Christensen et al. 2014 on the Nordic countries) – 
both public institutions have been operating under increasingly adverse financial 
conditions and exposed to large-scale systemic reforms across both Western and 
Eastern Europe (Zgaga et al. 2015; Stensaker at al. 2012). 
 
This chapter is not about reforms and their current and future directions in the public 
sector, though. It is about an increasing internal competition between major 
 3
components of the widely understood welfare state architecture as it has emerged in 
the last half a century: in particular, between old-aged pensions, healthcare systems 
and higher education and academic research as major claimants to the public purse. 
The competition is not only for public funding, although the financial dimension of 
ongoing transformations is of paramount importance (Kwiek 2015b); it is also for the 
place these three public institutions take in global, European and national social 
imagination. The assumption of this chapter is that public institutions cannot thrive 
without powerful supportive discourses concerning their social roles. When these 
discourses – which provide social legitimation combined with public funding – 
weaken, institutions weaken together with them. I focus on an ongoing and still 
largely latent struggle between major public institutions, with some predictions about 
its outcome.  
 
Historically, the welfare state after the “Golden Age” of the 1960s and the early 1970s 
entered an era of austerity that forced it “off the path of ever-increasing social 
spending and ever-expanding state responsibilities” (Leibfried and Mau 2008: xiii). 
Similarly, public higher education and research in Europe also stopped being a 
permanent “growth industry” and the “expansive regime” of science of the postwar 
period, with the rate of accumulation steadily accelerating over time, was replaced 
with a new regime that John Ziman termed “science in a ‘steady state’” (Ziman 1994: 
67, 90). Europe has been struggling with long-term consequences of both processes in 
both sectors for several decades now, with different pace, nature and depth of changes 
in different countries. Ever-expanding “endless frontier” in science promoted by 
Vannevar Bush (1945) is no longer with us – and in the last two decades universities 
have been exposed to large-scale reform attempts, as widely analyzed in higher 
education research (see especially recent collective volumes on reform dynamics in 
Europe: Stensaker et al. 2012; Enders et al. 2011; Schuetze et al. 2012; Zgaga et al. 
2015; and Kwiek 2015a). 
 
2. From producing “national glue” to producing “national wealth”  
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I assume in this chapter, following John S. Dryzek’s theory of institutional design 
(Dryzek 1996; see also Goodin 1996), that “no institution can operate without an 
associated and supportive discourse (or discourses). Discourses may best be treated as 
institutional software”; furthermore, “society’s discourses are intertwined with its 
institutions” (Dryzek 1996: 104, 103). Institutional design – or reform-related changes 
in public institutions – results from “reshaping the constellation of discourses in 
society” (Dryzek 1996: 104). Both welfare state and universities are highly dependent 
on their supportive discourses, as they are highly dependent on public funding and 
highly sensitive to changing relationships with their environments. And these 
discourses are under global construction and global renegotiations today.  
 
Historically, the power of the modern university over the last two hundred years 
resulted from the power of the accompanying (supportive) discourse of modernity in 
which the university held a central, highlighted, specific (and carefully secured) place 
in European societies (Rothblatt and Wittrock 1993; Wittrock 1993; Kwiek 2006: 139-
270; Kwiek 2013: 107-190). Modern universities as knowledge-producing institutions 
were born together with the nation-state (and its 19th-century industrialism). Björn 
Wittrock in his historical essay about the modern university wrote that “universities 
form part and parcel of the very same process which manifests itself in the emergence 
of an industrial economic order and the nation-state as the most typical and most 
important form of political organization” (Wittrock 1993: 305). The modern university 
was producing national glue and national consciousness, holding together emergent 
European nation-states. An idea of a research-oriented university was born in the 
minds of German Idealist philosophers (Kwiek 2006: 81-138) and still captures the 
imagination of European societies, recently reinforced by the idea of nationally-
located world-class universities. Keeping the institution’s high position in the future 
social, cultural and economic architecture of European nations requires a strong 
supporting discourse to sustain – if not increase – public confidence, without which it 
is hard to maintain a high level of public trust (and public funding).  
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Therefore, I argue here, the struggles over future forms of such public institutions as 
the university are also, perhaps above all, the struggles over discourses legitimizing 
their social, cultural and economic standing: in the last decade, those struggles have 
intensified and for the first time became global, with ever stronger engagement of 
international and transnational organizations and institutions (see “international 
incentives for national policy-making” in Martens and Jakobi 2010 and 
“internationalized education policy” in Jakobi 2009). To a large extent, the future of 
European universities and the level of their public subsidization will depend on the 
social and political acceptance of new legitimizing discourses currently being 
produced about them. They are being produced especially at supranational levels 
increasingly accepted in national policymaking communities across Europe, albeit 
with stronger or lighter “national filters” or with an interplay between “global reform 
scripts” for universities and their regional “epistemic and normative ‘counterscripts’”, 
as explored in the Nordic context (Christensen et al. 2014: 45). Widely accepted 
supportive discourses for public universities seem to be still in the making, amidst 
transformations of their environments (Välimaa and Hoffman 2008). From a longer 
historical perspective, despite strong academic reluctance across the globe, it might be 
the case that “science must be expected to keep up with the times” and that the only 
arguments to carry any weight for the expansion of science may be those that 
emphasize its “promise of future wealth or other tangible benefits” (Ziman 1994: 84, 
85); hence, in more current parlance, the increasing popularity in European policy 
circles of the knowledge economy discourse (for research) and the private good logics 
(for teaching). 
 
Major questions about the future of the university are parallel to those about the future 
of the welfare state; as Pierre Pestieau (2006: 67) expressed it elegantly in the context 
of the latter: “the key issue is to figure out what we really want. Do we want the 
welfare state as it is, a market economy with no social protection, or a market 
economy with protection provided by the private sector?”. “What we really want” in 
his formulation means, in various national circumstances, powerful supportive 
discourses resulting from various interrelated factors. Regarding the university of the 
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future: we need to know what we want and need to promote in society the ideas why 
we want it. We also need to make sure this voice is strong – as there is direct 
competition with other voices in favour of other social needs (Kwiek 2015b), and 
there are competing supportive discourse in favour of something else much more than 
in favour of universities, or in favour of universities being conceived of (and 
especially governed and funded) differently than we academics conceive them. The 
core of this strong voice conveying an academic message should be, in my view, 
increased institutional autonomy combined with at least maintained, and hopefully 
increased, levels of public funding. Public universities in Continental Europe need 
substantial public funding to continue their missions – and this message needs 
continued justification. To refer to John Ziman again, 
 
Any activity requiring a total layout of several percent of the national GNP is 
in serious competition with other desirable items of public or private 
expenditure, and has to be justified in that context (Ziman 1994: 83). 
 
In any competition there are always winners and losers, and the outcomes of the 
cross-generational and intra-national competition to be at the top of publicly-funded 
social priorities are unpredictable. Financial, ideological and electoral pressures on the 
reconfiguration of spending priorities discussed below are bound to intensify across 
Europe. In Central Europe, they emerged already in the 1990s due to financial 
austerity experienced following the collapse of communism in 1989 (Kwiek 2007), 
and the institution of the university was among the losers. Its supporting discourse 
was far too weak – and its access to public funds was not viewed as social priority 
(Kwiek 2012), with long-term negative implications. 
 
3. From “expansion” to “steady state” to “permanent austerity” 
 
In the postwar period, there was no explicit internal competition between different 
social needs and the various components of the welfare state. Booming higher 
education and academic research was not in direct competition with expanding 
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pension and healthcare systems at that time (in the expansion period, universities were 
also in much less competition internally; in the current period, “project is weighted 
against project, programme against programme, and field against field, according to 
criteria that are heavily influenced by political or commercial priorities”, as Ziman 
suggested already two decade ago, Ziman 1994: 84). Public funding for the three 
sectors was substantial and the pillars of favourable social attitudes to them were solid. 
National pies of tax-derived public funds available were expanding. “Growth 
industries” can always slow down or stop, however, for financial, ideological and 
electoral reasons. And in the times of financial austerity – lasting for at least two 
decades now, and intensified since 2008 in Europe – social configurations in which 
various public institutions function can be radically redefined, with unpredictable 
implications for the future.  
 
The stagnation which started in the mid-seventies in Europe was perhaps the first 
symptom that the welfare system in the form designed for one period (that is, the post-
war reconstruction of Europe) might be not be working in a different period. As Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen, a pioneering figure in European welfare studies, put it succinctly,  
 
most European social protection systems were constructed in an era with a very 
different distribution and intensity of risks and needs than exist today. … As a 
consequence, the welfare state is burdened with responsibilities for which it 
was not designed (Esping-Andersen 2001). 
 
The post-war social contract was related to an industrial economy in a period of 
considerable growth, the male bread-winner model of work, closed, national 
economies with largely national competition for investment, goods, products and 
services (see Kwiek 2005). Since the seventies, the marriage of the nation-state and 
the welfare-state has been under powerful internal and external pressures. As Alex 
Dumas and Bryan S. Turner (2009: 49) point out from a longer historical perspective, 
“old age and retirement are products of the demographic transition (from high to low 
fertility and increased life expectancy) and industrialization”. Consequently, the social 
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agenda of the eighties and nineties changed radically: after the policies of the Golden 
Age of expansion, European welfare states have been shaped by Paul Pierson’s 
“permanent austerity” (Pierson 2001b).  
 
The post-war period of growth in higher education in Europe coincided with the 
development of post-war welfare states across the continent. Massification processes 
in European higher education were closely linked to the growth and consolidation of 
European welfare states. Currently, while massification processes in higher education 
are in full swing across Europe – welfare states are under the most far-reaching 
restructuring in their post-war history (Bonoli and Natali 2012; Hemerijck 2013; 
Palier 2010; Häusermann 2010; and Connelly and Hayward 2012). On top of this, 
European welfare states may be at risk of becoming a “crisis casualty in the cascade 
of violent economic, social, and political aftershocks, unleashed by the global 
financial crisis” (Hemerijck 2013: 1). In more general terms, the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis may mark a “stress test” for the whole construction of the 
welfare state in Europe (Hemerijck 2013: 68). Or, as Peter Starke and colleagues 
argue in their study of policy responses to economic crisis across Europe,  
 
A huge pile of public debt restricts the room for manoeuvre, and makes even 
some conventional state functions appear like luxuries. Austerity is bound to 
remain the guiding force in years to come and painful cuts are the only thing 
left to be distributed (Starke et al. 2013: 2). 
 
The current restructuring of the foundations of the welfare state may change the way 
both policymakers and European societies view higher education. The financial 
dimension of ongoing changes in both welfare state and higher education seems 
crucial, especially that the total costs generated by welfare state components, as well 
as each of them separately, cannot be easily reduced.  
 
4. “University attitudes” and “welfare attitudes”: key to social 
legitimacy and public funding 
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Universities (and all public sector services) are not only heavily dependent on the 
public purse, or on the national financial context in which they are embedded; they 
are also – of interest to me here – heavily dependent on the social fabric in which they 
are embedded. They are closely linked in individual countries (traditional nation-
states) to their usually shrinking tax base or at least the tax base increasingly 
insufficient to mounting social and infrastructural needs. They are also closely linked 
to weak or strong social “attitudes”, expressed in larger weak or strong social 
supportive discourses.  
 
Historically, the tax base for the three components of the welfare state was in place, 
social attitudes were highly favourable, and supportive discourses were powerful: 
from the beginning of the modern European university in the early 19th century, a high 
social and economic standing of the university has remained unchallenged. The power 
of the modern university rested in the power of the modern nation state: the social 
contract between the two was as strong in the 19th century as it was in the period of its 
massive  expansion in the post-war period (see Kwiek 2006). Not surprisingly, the 
period of the most impressive growth of higher education Europe coincided with the 
period of the most impressive growth of European welfare states, and especially with 
its “Golden age” of the third quarter of the 20th century. In the European social 
imagination (both in the capitalist West and in the socialist East), optimism regarding 
the future prevailed: growth seemed unimpeded and financial limits seemed distant. 
Welfare state entitlements used to grow in every generation and universities and 
academic research used to grow exponentially. In short: citizens were ever-better 
entitled and secured against social ills, and there were ever more ever-better 
scientifically equipped researchers; as if the sky was the limit. Researchers were 
working “under conditions of continuous expansion” and on the tacit assumption that 
expansion “will never cease” (Ziman 1994: 13). Until there appeared “limits to 
growth”. The emergent limits were financial. Higher education in its traditional 
European forms has been largely publicly-funded. As Gareth Williams points out, “by 
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the mid-1970s the idea of higher education as a publicly provided service was 
overwhelmingly the dominant model” (Williams 1992: 135).  
 
In a similar vein, European citizens were being ever more protected against all sorts 
of social ills troubling them in the pre-war period, with affordable and effective public 
healthcare and reasonable, if not lavish, old-age pensions systems in the times termed 
by Paul Pierson as “welfare state maturation” (Pierson 2001a: 88-92). The current 
increased fiscal demands on the welfare state come predominantly from these two 
major components – healthcare and pensions (neither linked to globalization and 
economic integration) – in the context of rapid population aging.  
 
Public institutions change over time, and social attitudes to public institutions also 
change over time. What I term here “university attitudes” in European societies today 
may be studied in parallel to recently studied “welfare attitudes”. Stefan Svallfors’ 
large-scale comparative research project on “welfare attitudes” studied the legitimacy 
of current welfare state arrangements across European countries and the USA: 
 
Attitudes toward the welfare state and other public institutions should be seen 
as central components of social order, governance, and legitimacy of modern 
societies. They tell us something about whether or not existing social 
arrangements are legitimate (Svallfors 2012: 2). 
 
Thus, in general, changing attitudes toward the welfare state and other public 
institutions (including universities) may lead to changing founding ideas of public 
institutions; and reforms of public institutions may be – although do not have to be – a 
reflection of changing attitudes. But if changing fiscal environments (towards less 
friendly) coincide with changing attitudes (towards less supportive), higher education 
reforms may be deeper and policy changes – more abrupt. This may be the case in 
some European countries, potentially especially in Central Europe, with large cuts in 
public funding after 2008 (see Kwiek 2016). 
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The modernization of European universities – as promoted, for instance, by the 
European Commission – can be viewed in parallel to what Silja Häuserman (2010: 1) 
termed the “modernization in hard times” with reference to the transformations of the 
Continental welfare state: “modernization refers to the adaptation of existing 
institutional arrangements to the economic and social structures of post-industrialism. 
… The hard times result from the gap between declining resources and the growing 
(financial) needs that these modernization processes entail”. Most OECD countries 
are currently experiencing a shrinking tax base: as Pierre Pestieau put it already a 
decade ago, “the share of regular, steady salaried labor is declining in a large number 
of countries, and thus the share of payroll tax base in the GDP is shrinking” (Pestieau 
2006: 35). The constraints on public revenues are combined with growing social 
needs due to the aging of European societies, increasingly costly past entitlements in 
the pension sector, increasingly effective but also expensive healthcare sector, 
changing family structures, as well as under the pressures of economic globalization. 
As Pierson explained in 2001, long before the recent financial crisis came, “a context 
of essentially permanent austerity” is linked to a long list of factors inherent to the 
development of welfare states (Pierson 2001b: 411).  
 
Age structure of our societies increasingly matters. In aging societies, the priorities of 
older generations (such as healthcare and pensions) may be stronger than ever before, 
leaving higher education (rather than general education) lower on the list of social 
priorities. Resources can be steered “toward pensions and health care and away from 
educational investments for younger generations. As age conflict increases, the 
possibilities for age integration decline” (Dumas and Turner 2009: 51). Reforms to 
both sectors may go in parallel, according to similar “global scripts” produced at a 
supranational level but their outcomes may be dependent on wider social 
intergenerational conflicts. In the overall context of welfare state expenditures, health 
care, in comparison with pensions and unemployment benefits, has not shown signs of 
retrenchment, at least until the recent crisis (Pavolini and Guillén 2013: 276; Rothgang 
et al. 2010: 247). But it is “in a state of permanent transformation” caused by the 
following tension:  
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As demographic change and advancements in medical technology increase the 
demand for healthcare, globalization limits the amount of public funds that can 
go into it. As a result, the need for reforms that assure cost containment and at 
the same time guarantee high quality healthcare services for the population has 
increased (Rothgang et al. 2010: 3).  
 
5. Financial, ideological, and electoral pressures on public institutions 
 
There are three separate types of pressures on public services which need to be kept in 
mind while discussing the future of the institution of the university: financial, 
ideological, and electoral. They are all closely related and influencing one another, 
with electoral pressures possibly being most important.  
 
First, financial pressures are relatively easy to be defined: public costs of teaching and 
academic research are escalating, as are those of maintaining advanced healthcare 
systems (Rothgang et al. 2010) and pension systems for aging European populations. 
As Alex Dumas and Bryan S. Turner (2009: 50) argue, “it is well recognized that the 
welfare states of Europe have rested on an explicit social contract between 
generations”. Any changes in the contract are bound to produce both winners and 
losers among different welfare state components. Some state responsibilities in some 
policy areas may have to be scaled down. One of possible areas for social 
renegotiation is clearly the mass public subsidization of higher education. Even 
though its outcome is still undetermined, in several European countries the pressure to 
pump ever more private funding into higher education (through fees and business 
contracts) has been mounting, with the UK as a prime example. 
 
Second, ideological pressures come mainly from global financial institutions and 
international organizations involved in the data collection and analysis of broader 
public sector services, especially the World Bank. They tend to disseminate the view – 
in different countries to different degrees – that, in general, the public sector is less 
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efficient than the private sector; its maintenance costs may exceed social benefits 
brought by it; and that it deserves less unconditional social trust combined with less 
unconditional public funding. While detailed arguments in favour of reforms vary over 
time and across European countries, overall they seem to be increasingly convergent, 
especially at transnational levels (OECD,  World Bank, and, following the 2008 
economic crisis, the European Commission). The former two organizations have been 
the major providers of analytical frameworks, definitions, large-scale comparative 
datasets and extended analyses of pensions, healthcare, and higher education in the last 
decade. Global interests lead to global agendas along with global diffusion on the one 
hand and global data collection and analysis on the other (Jakobi 2009). The role of 
global ideas in national policy-making increases (Martens and Jakobi 2010). The 
OECD is a global health, pensions and education actor. It singles out important issues 
and sets agendas, presents visions and values, develops scenarios, and defines guiding 
principles and concepts; finally, “it identifies present tendencies and future problems 
that are later discussed at national level” (Martens and Jakobi 2010: 9). Not 
surprisingly, education policy statements “sound increasingly and astonishingly 
similar all over the world” (Jakobi 2009: 2). Soft mechanisms involved in “OECD 
governance” include “idea production”, “policy evaluation”, and “data production” 
(Martens and Jakobi 2010: 266-268). 
 
Finally, there are changeable electoral or public pressures, linked to both financial and 
ideological ones through public discussions, media coverage and personal 
experiences. Electoral perceptions of the public sector in general (like public “welfare 
attitudes” towards welfare services) may gradually influence electoral perceptions of 
universities and the ways they should be financed in the future. Newly emergent 
“university attitudes” across Europe – focusing on private goods and individual 
benefits rather than public goods and collective benefits produced in them – may be 
gradually changing the social circumstances in which universities are embedded; they 
may be more hostile to traditional Continental European mechanisms of full public 
subsidization, and more open to high-fees/high-loans mechanisms prevalent in the 
Anglo-Saxon world, with powerful implications for the nature of the institution. 
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So, alongside with dealing with financial and ideological pressures, universities have 
to be dealing with long-term effects of changes in beliefs of European electorates, 
being of key importance for changes in the positions of leading national political 
parties across the continent. Within economic constraints, “the overall size of the 
welfare state and the extent of redistribution remain a matter of political choice” 
(Scharpf and Schmidt 2000: 336). In democracies, voters play a crucial role – and in 
Europe they are currently attached to both the two major components of the welfare 
state (publicly-funded pensions and tax-based healthcare) and to tuition-free public 
higher education (Altbach et al. 2010), Europe still being “one of the last hold-outs of 
free higher education” (Marcucci 2013: 19). However, under conditions of the 
increasing competition for public resources between various claimants, steering 
resources away from educational investments should not be excluded, generational 
interests being on a collision course (Dumas and Turner 2009: 51-52).  
 
Although we cannot define the long-term impact of the economic crisis on higher 
education, we can provisionally assume that “welfare attitudes” in general will not 
differ substantially from “university attitudes” in particular, and globally-supported 
funding solutions for mass higher education systems will be more popular in Europe 
than nationally-promoted ones, except perhaps for selected small and ultra-rich 
European countries such as Norway or Switzerland. 
 
6. Final thoughts 
 
There are four reasons why universities (and academic research) in the times of 
permanent financial austerity need more social trust and stronger public support to 
maintain or increase its public subsidization. 
 
First, growing intergenerational conflicts in aging European societies do increase the 
power of arguments supporting higher public funding for the other two high-spenders: 
pensions and healthcare, being in direct competition with universities (with “age wars” 
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possibly replacing “class wars” in the future, Dumas and Turner 2009: 51). 
Universities have to confront increasing public support for the other two high-
spenders. 
 
Second, current entitlements in both pensions and healthcare systems (even redefined 
and recalibrated: either “rationalized” or “updated”, Pierson 2001a: 425-427) have 
been growing exponentially due to decisions from the expansion period, with the 
accompanying large-scale social acceptance for both systems across Europe. 
Universities have to confront an accumulation of past entitlements in the other two 
high-spenders which makes competition more difficult than in the past. 
 
Third, while the two high-spenders clearly follow the logics of public goods in their 
functioning, universities are being increasingly reconceptualised, especially at a 
supranational level, as following the logics of private goods in both teaching (students 
reconceptualised as consumers) and research (research results reconceptualised as 
selleable, commercialized commodities). The logics of public goods used by the other 
two high-spenders is intrinsically linked to high public subsidization, while that of 
private goods is not. Universities have to confront the different normative basis of the 
other two high-spenders in its competition for legitimacy and public funding. 
 
And fourth, the rules of a zero-sum game apply more in tight fiscal times than in 
relaxed ones: as European societies in the post-2008 period entered the period of 
permanent financial austerity, higher public expenditures in one sector occur at the 
expense of expenditures in other sectors. Universities have to confront the task of 
showing their higher social usefulness compared with all other high-spenders (as 
societies may increasingly value what universities produce “relative to how those 
resources could be used elsewhere”, Salerno 2007: 121). 
 
The current condition of permanent financial austerity may redefine the nature of the 
European university as a public institution. Its future depends, to a considerable extent, 
on favourable social attitudes and strong supporting public discourses, both 
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changeable under economic, ideological and electoral pressures. Therefore no public 
institution should take for granted its survival in an untouched form without powerful 
social support. No rights seem to have been given forever, and public trust does not 
seem to have been guaranteed: both need to be thoughtfully and continuously fought 
for. Their combination indirectly determines the level of public subsidization, being 
redefined after a long period of postwar growth when the cross-sectoral competition 
between the different public-sector claimants for public funding was not present. 
Comfortably friendly before the age of financial austerity came, different public 
services in Europe are now beginning to operate in the context of increasing, albeit 
still latent, competition: for social trust, public support and public funding.  
 
To thrive in the age of permanent financial austerity, the academic profession needs to 
know what their preferred image of the university is; how they want to function within 
it, and why they want it  – in order to be able to promote a strong supporting discourse 
about the key social and economic relevance of their institutions and themselves. In 
tough times, under adverse economic conditions, the preferred image needs to be clear 
and widely promoted. Confronting the two competing high-spenders, pensions and 
healthcare systems, does not seem to be easy in the context of growing cross-
generational conflicts over public resources. However, optimistically, European 
governments most often follow public attitudes, and electoral pressures still do matter. 
All we need to do as academics is to promote universities in our societies as (still) 
highly legitimate, socially useful and publicly fundable institutions, and count on 
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